




BUSINESS STRATEGIES UNDER STABILIZATION 
AND TRADE OPENESS IN THE 1990s
Bernardo Kosacoff
yu u u 2 1 965 - BIBLIOTECA CEPAL
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Organization.
900021965




The Argentine economy is going through a major transformation process. 
Stabilization is not just about solving simple disequilibria but involves profound structural 
reforms needed to overcome coordination failures and return the economy to an equilibrium 
path. Until the introduction of the Convertibility Plan in 1991 the long-dominant pattern was 
one of (1) exceedingly volatile relative prices, (2) fiscal and external disequilibria and (3) 
extreme preferences being shown by economic agents for flexibility, due to the high 
uncertainty they faced in a permanently inflationary context with hyperinflationary episodes 
in 1989 and 1990. All these features are amongst those traits from the quite recent past 
which definitely must still be considered today when implementing economic policy.
Given that context, the recommendations that derive from the stabilization and 
structural reform programmes inspired by the ‘Washington Consensus’ - which are 
articulated in policies to achieve trade openness, deregulation and privatization of state- 
owned enterprises - do not in themselves offer a sufficiently helpful approach to 
understanding the multiple aspects involved in the dynamics of structural change. Strikingly 
absent is any analysis of how businesses react to the implementation of these programmes 
- and that means that an implicit assumption has been made: i.e. that business reactions are 
automatic and can be counted on to produce a new specialization pattern that is compatible 
with both macroeconomic discipline and obtaining suitable linkages into the international 
economy.
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However, the experience that actually emerges from analysis of changes In 
Argentina's industrial sector in the last two decades shows that the nature of business 
reactions is much more complex than this. In fact the observations reveal what can be 
described as diverse and contrasting business behaviours whose sequences and timing 
differ greatly from both the timetable of the openness process and the timing of when 
modifications in the key macroeconomic parameters occurred. Likewise, it turns out that the 
1 current dynamics of structural change have been strongly influenced by the previous phase
of the economic process; that public and private institutions have not yet caught up with the 
new scenario; and that, in many cases, the private benefits generated by business strategies 
have not coincided with the social benefits.
The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the analysis of the recent process of 
industrial transformation in Argentina. In particular, it will focus on the specific factors which 
have been responsible for the existence of different business reactions within the dynamics 
of structural change in the Argentine economy in the period 1975-95. Likewise, it will 
consider the effects of changes in the macroeconomic conditions and in the international 
scenario and changes in the linkages between firms and the market. The entire process will 
be assessed not as a problem of producing industrial goods solely, but as one that involves 
the simultaneous need to generate industrial goods and develop the technological 
capabilities needed to succeed in establishing a specialization pattern in a context of 
transformation and integration into the global economy.
Section two presents a very stylized analysis of the central features of Argentina's 
industrial transformation over the period 1975-95. It seeks to evaluate some of the 
. determinants of business reactions and see why such contrasting kinds of behaviours
occurred. The analysis it offers is in terms of two behavior patterns: the first one is called
%
the ‘offensive’ restructuring strategy while the other involves a survivors' strategy,
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characterized as a ‘defensive’ one1. Some features of each of these strategies are 
described.
Section three presents some observations on how firms behaved during the 
Convertibility Plan that started in 1991. Two stages are distinguished: the first one refers to 
the period 1991-94; the second one is associated with the changes that were trjggered-off 
once the international interest rate was modified in early 1994, and especially concerns the
1
changes that occurred after the Mexican currency was devalued towards the end of 1994 - 
the so-called Tequila effect’.
Section four analyses the changes that have occurred in the behavior and structure 
of industrial firms in the 1990s: it emphasizes changes in firms' production functions and in 
the technological trajectories pursued by them, and discusses the ‘boundaries’ which 
industrial firms have.
Lastly, Section 5 makes a brief assessment of the way in which industry has
»
recently been developing.
2. Changes in the 1975-95 period
Between 1975 and 1995 output from the Argentine industrial sector stagnated, and 
industry also lost its capacity to create employment or lead the way in investment as it had 
done in the past. A look at the industrial sector in 1995, as compared to 20 years earlier in 
1975, reveals that deep changes have occurred (Azpiazu and Nochteff, 1995; Chudnovsky, 
Lopez and Porta, 1996; Kosacoff, 1994). Although the size of industry is similar to what it 
* was in 1975, its organizational pattern (or ‘model’) is very different from the pattern
obtaining in the semi-closed economy period. In fact this transformation is the outcome of




strategies by some industrial firms and resort by the rest of the firms to what we have 
termed as defensive strategies.
Offensive restructuring involves making major investments in machinery and 
equipment and combining this with far-reaching organizational changes in production 
methods. Implementing this strategy has led to remarkable increases in productivity, which 
now nearly match the international best practice standards. The first question that arises is - 
to what extent has offensive restructuring spread throughout Argentine industry? It turns out 
that one can identify around 400 firms that have offensive strategies. They account for 
about 40 per cent of 1995 industrial output. What conclusion can be drawn from this? It is 
that a large number of remarkably successful microeconomic cases exist - but that when the 
figures for the whole of industry are aggregated, the overall result is still not powerful 
enough to generate a new pattern of specialization for Argentine industry that could 
represent a sustainable long-run model of development.
In which sectors are these firms found? They are spread throughout the entire 
industrial fabric, and can even be found in those branches that were most severely affected 
by the economic openness process and by macroeconomic instability. However they are 
really prominent in four particular areas. The first one corresponds to the basic input- 
producing industries (which mainly manufacture widely used intermediate inputs such as 
iron and steel, petrochemicals, cement, oil from refineries, and aluminium, etc.). These 
industries have been through a transformation. Today some 20 to 25 modern plants that 
manufacture basic inputs exist, as a result of active government policies, and all of them 
operate on an international scale.2
The second area arises from the dynamic growth that has occurred since the mid- 
1970s in Argentina's stock of natural resources - in a break from four previous decades of 
stagnation. It is noticeable that Argentina's expanded new capacity in the natural resources 
field is linked to some industrial activities which add value to these resources in final-stage
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processing plants that operate at levels equal or close to international best practice - as is 
the case for the oilseeds industry, the petrochemicals industry, and others.3
The third area is Argentina's motor vehicles industry, which nowadays has some 
strikingly different features from in the past. The transformation within this sector has been 
very heterogeneous. The core group of manufacturers, who operate at standards close to 
international best practice, are makers of a selective range of motor-vehicle parts, most of 
which go to supply the final-assembly plants. Furthermore this core group of parts makers 
has export capacity that partly compensates for the increased levels of imports by the rest 
of the sector - especially by the final-assembly plants. Meanwhile, although the assembly 
plants are more modern than in the past, they still lag far behind international best practice.4
Lastly comes a more recent development that has involved investments being 
made in some 30 to 40 relatively very modern industrial plants that make dairy products, 
sweets, telephone equipment, and other industrial products (Subsecretaría de Inversiones, 
1995). This development has arisen as a response to the strong increases that have 
occurred since 1991 in the consumption of some specific differentiated goods by the 
domestic mass market.
Turning now to the second ‘avenue’ of change identified above - what does it 
involve? This is the survivors' avenue: the firms concerned are survivors firstly of the late- 
1970s openness policy, secondly of the macroeconomic crisis of the 1980s, and thirdly of 
the new competitive conditions which Convertibility established. Many other firms did not 
survive. From 1975 to 1995 a large number of firms disappeared and relatively few 
newcomers joined the industrial structure. Altogether, some 25 000 firms (leaving out small 
workshops) have adopted defensive strategies, and they account for 60 per cent of 
Argentine industrial output.
What can be observed in the industrial plants of these firms? The plants are clearly 
very different from what they were like 20 years ago. Productivity in them has also
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increased notably. However, the achieving of efficiency levels in these plants that may be 
regarded as marking genuine progress in terms of their own previous record looks rather 
different if the benchmark for comparison is taken as being international best practice. From 
that standpoint there still remains a very sizable technological gap - although it is not 
possible to say if that gap is smaller or larger than it was in the past. In other words, 
although average productivity in these plants has increased by very roughly 10 0  per cent (to 
use an estimated figure for the increase that cannot simply be dismissed as insignificant) 
the fact remains that even the achievement of a good performance relative to these plants’ 
previous efficiency levels still leaves them a long way off the standards needed for them to 
be able to compete in open-economy conditions.
Why did productivity in these plants increase? There are three sources that 
produced the improvement. The first one is the laying-off of employees which started in the 
mid-1970s and which still continues today: firms have retained the same output capacity, 
but at much lower staffing levels. The second factor involves the introduction of 
organizational changes: all these plants in Argentina have gradually adopted a much more 
modern set of organizational practices than in the past even though such practices are not 
yet as widespread throughout the local society as they are in advanced industrial countries. 
The third source comes from the investments that have been made throughout all these 
industrial plants, but which have been of a narrowly targeted and specific kind, and for which 
the decision to invest has typically been geared to fit in with the upswings in the business 
cycle. This was the case under Martínez de Hoz (1978-81), under the Austral Plan (1985-87) 
and again under the Convertibility Plan 1991 onwards. Essentially, the business people in 
charge of such plants are operating with machinery and equipment that was purchased in 
the 1960s or 1970s. The consequence is that the typical industrial plant is one in which 
many technologies of different generations and vintages are combined, and where the plant 
suffers from major imbalances and bottlenecks. In consequence, when the level of output
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has to be expanded, what then happens is that precise investment targeting occurs, so as to 
tackle some of these specific problems. This may, for example, involve resolving a paint- 
treatment problem or a packaging problem, or require the balancing production lines, and so 
forth. This will leave the main plant structure itself unaltered - yet these targeted and 
specific investments have a positive impact on the firm's productivity levels. Even so, these 
industrial plants continue to retain the underlying features of workshops during the import 
substitution stage (Katz and Kosacoff, 1989). They are completely out of scale. On average, 
industrial plants in Argentina have only 5-10 per cent of the optimum scale that prevails at 
the international technological frontier and operate with very few economies of 
specialization. Argentina's industrial sector continues to be characterized by very limited 
development of specialized suppliers and subcontractors - and this contributes to the levels 
of vertical integration being too high and the scale of plants being too low.
What are the factors that have produced such contrasting responses at the firm 
level? In the first place, firms' behaviours and strategies have been deeply influenced by the 
various changes that took place in Argentina's macroeconomic situation and the associated 
changes made to incentives and regulations over the past two decades (see Fanelli and 
Frenkel, 1994).
The turning point in the evolutionary process occurring under the ISI model in 
Argentina came with the failure of the country's experiment to open-up the economy at the 
end of the 1970s. At that time the various sectors were by no means all in an identical 
situation. The trajectories which firms had been following until then - in terms of maturing 
and developing their competitive capabilities - were heterogeneous. From that starting point, 
it Is observable that those previous trajectories have proved to be a crucial determinant of 
these firms' subsequent behavior - and the impact of this can clearly be seen at sector level, 
too. The point is that the previous developmental paths (or trajectories) of firms must be
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regarded as an explanatory factor in accounting for how firms actually respond during an 
adjustment process.
The second determining factor in leading to such contrasting firm-level responses 
relates to the profound changes that took place in the international technological paradigm 
in the two decades under discussion (1975-95) - and to the reality that the intensity of these 
technological changes was different for each sector. Therefore the fact that there is sector- 
by-sector variation in the extent to which changes in international-best-practice technology 
occur (during any specified period) provides a second reason to explain why differential firm 
behaviours exist within industry.
The third factor concerns the size and dynamism of the domestic market. In the new 
context of an open economy and economic integration into the MERCOSUR common 
market, this factor helps account for variations in how firms have reacted (Kosacoff, 1995).
The fourth factor is associated with Argentina's natural resources endowment and 
the expanded levels of activity in discovering and exploiting natural resources in recent 
years - in marked contrast to the prolonged stagnation in this area that was a feature of the 
semi-closed economy period.
The fifth determining factor is that some of the industrial and trade policies applied 
have been selective ones - which has, for obvious reasons, induced differential responses 
within industry.
Sixthly (and lastly) a very important factor concerns the different kinds of economic 
agents who operate in the business sector. This must be considered on two levels. First, it 
obviously does make a big difference whether a firm is a subsidiary of a transnational 
corporation (TC), or is a national holding company, or is a small or medium-sized enterprise 
(an SME) - because firms in all three groups respond to very different sets of incentives. 
Second, the track records of individual firms demonstrate that both firm behavior and 
entrepreneurial attitudes can vary over a huge range depending on how firms are organized,
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how risk-averse they are, what their attitudes towards innovation are, and so forth. Just by 
way of example, if we consider an SME which has already handed control over to the next 
generation or which has already undergone substantial restructuring, then that SME is likely 
to perform in a different way from an SME which is still passing through a conflictive 
transitional phase and which has not achieved clarity as to what its main goals should be.
3. Industry during the Convertibility Plan
Convertibility5 brought with it three kinds of good news for business people, which is 
why they have strongly supported it. Firstly it brought about stability - which reduced the 
levels of uncertainty firms were facing in relation to their markets. New types of 
uncertainties then arose for firms in terms of the right competitive strategy to adopt from 
then on - but at least the context was now quite different when compared to the kinds of 
uncertainty that had marked the previous decade. The second effect of Convertibility was 
that it led to a recovery in the growth of demand: in fact the output level rose continuously 
for 19 uninterrupted quarters, even though growth rates differed markedly between sectors. 
The third kind of ‘good news’ was the wealth effect, which refers to the rise that took place in 
expected future incomes. (This effect was associated with a growing output level, and with a 
reduction in the rate at which economic agents discounted future income, and with a setting 
where the local currency was appreciating in value.)
These three developments (arising from the Convertibility policy) inevitably led to 
pressures on firms to redefine their scope and boundaries in relation to the market. In the 
new conditions that Convertibility brought with it, the perennial question facing firms of 
'What to make versus what to buy?’ had to be posed by them once again, but this time in 
the very different context of markets that functioned with lower transaction costs and much
less uncertainty than before. These changed conditions obliged firms to redefine their
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positions in matters such as (a) their network of suppliers, which often needed to be 
respecified, and (b) outsourcing some of the services that they previously had been 
handling in-house, and (c) making changes as regards inter-firm cooperation, as well as in 
their levels of horizontal and vertical integration, and so on. All these areas are ones where 
firms went through deep changes during the Convertibility period. At the same time firms 
were forced to reappraise their internal organizational structures, and adapt them to the new 
conditions.
These developments caused by Convertibility (and just described above) did not 
come ‘free’, especially for firms that adopted defensive adjustment strategies. The first point 
to stress is that trade-openness policy intrinsically sets upper limits on firms' ability to fix 
prices, and so - unlike in the 1980s - firms could no longer simply pass on their raised costs 
to their customers in the form of higher prices. Indeed the Convertibility Plan was 
remarkably successful in stabilizing prices. However it did, when first applied, lead to some 
drastic changes in relative prices, which favored the prices of non-tradable goods to the 
detriment of the prices of those industrial goods that competed with foreign goods (Fanelli, 
Kacef, and Machinea, 1994; Gerchunoff and Machinea, 1995). This led to a rise in the 
prices of those non-tradable goods, which in turn impacted on firms' cost structures, and this 
particularly affected small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Also the government's 
improved administrative efficiency in collecting both taxes and employee social security 
charges, led to a further impact on the cost levels of these firms.
What mechanisms have firms had available to them to offset these kinds of cost 
increments in the new environment? Basically, three mechanisms exist which can reduce 
average costs and enable firms to survive. The first is through achieving productivity 
increases of the kind mentioned earlier. The second emerges from higher levels of 
economic activity and market concentration, and is based on the assumption that average 
costs will fall as production is organized at larger scales of output. The third one is through
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firms undertaking organizational changes, mergers and investments. Alongside the above 
mechanisms, the government, for its part, implemented a set of complementary 
deregulatory measures whose purpose was to improve the extent to which the systemic 
conditions of the economy would encourage firms to take steps to raise productivity and 
reduce unit costs (Azpiazu 1993; Squiglia and Delgado 1994).
However the struggle by firms to reduce their average costs has faced diminishing 
returns, because most of these firms still operate with the basic equipment they purchased 
in the 1960s or 1970s and have not restructured offensively. Hence, their efforts to lower 
their average costs have quickly run up against obstacles whereas, in contrast, no such 
hindrance has prevented cost rises from continuing to occur.
A second factor which has been having an effect on firms is the changes which 
have occurred in the financial market and in the types of financing which firms utilize 
(Bonvecchi, 1997). The advent of stability has put in place a totally different financial 
system from before. The first obvious change is that firms' financial requirements have risen 
notably. Why? Firstly, because the activity level has grown, but secondly and even more 
importantly, because commercial credit has started up again. The position that applied 
during periods of hyperinflation was, basically, that not much working capital was needed: 
buyers had to pay in advance, production was carried out with this money, and the 
difference due to indexation was collected, once the merchandise was delivered. Now there 
is a higher level of activity and merchandise is delivered on 60 to 90 days payment terms. 
The resulting financial requirements can be offset partly by recourse to commercial credit 
and partly by bank credit. But in spite of the growing monetization of the economy, the 
financial market is highly segmented. This has led to a significant rise in firms' 
indebtedness, held mainly in the form of foreign currency debts (due to their lower cost) and 
this has raised the level of these firms' financial exposure.6
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The impact of these various factors means that firms operate on the basis of a 
precarious balancing act, and they can only keep this going provided that the level of output 
is maintained. In such a delicate situation, profit margins get reduced, and hence gross 
profits can only be kept up by increasing the output level. But to achieve this - operating in 
this kind of market - requires firms to risk more money than in the past, which increases 
their indebtedness and financial exposure yet further.
This set of pressures has led firms into traveling the path from being a workshop to 
being a business enterprise'. Thus, firms tend to view themselves less and less in terms of 
the work they perform at the lathe, loom or machine-bench, and more and more in terms of 
how they perform at the cash register. In fact firms can, broadly speaking, be said to have 
moved on from the approach that they typically used to adopt as workshops in the import 
substitution epoch - and to have moved towards developing a three-sided strategy instead. 
The first aspect of this new strategy is that the firms do continue to manufacture goods. The 
second aspect is based on the observation that rising average costs are associated with 
increases in value-added - hence one method that firms can use for lowering their average 
costs is to break off from using local suppliers and rely instead on imported parts and inputs, 
whilst increasing their assembly activities at the expense of their manufacturing ones.7 The 
third aspect is that firms have been giving much greater priority to their sales and 
distribution networks - because these networks are capable of being turned into the best 
sales channels for imported products. In that regard, foreign manufacturers have identified 
domestic manufacturers as their best prospective partners for arranging sales into the local 
market - precisely because these local firms (a) already possess established distribution and 
sales networks, (b) know about local customers and (c) are basically capable of providing 
technical and after-sales services. The new emphasis on assembly and commercialization 
activities has arisen from the defensive strategies which firms have adopted in order to 




that they have specialized in more differentiated products and that they operate by staying 
in close touch with demand. But this whole process, which has involved a ‘defensive shift’ 
by firms into placing more emphasis on assembly and commercialization activities, has 
clearly also had two negative effects: firstly, employment is not being created, and, secondly 
- and of fundamental importance - new technological and manufacturing capabilities that 
would allow firms to become producers of higher value-added and more differentiated 
products are not being developed.
Manufacturers in this context (where heterogeneity was so prevalent) were 
subjected to various kinds of changes arising from developments in early 1994 when 
international conditions changed - and the impact on them became especially strong in the 
wake of the severe financial shock of the Tequila effect’ at the end of 1994. The changes 
which firms experienced were in several different areas, of which three will now be 
mentioned: they relate to (1) changes in financial conditions and arrangements, (2 ) the 
downturn in the ‘wealth effect’, and (3) changes in the level of output and the destination of 
goods produced.
First, as regards the financial situation, changes in the financial market put firms 
into serious jeopardy. As far as loans were concerned the restrictions applied to them 
became excessively onerous and intolerable. In many cases, international credit - including 
commercial credit - was interrupted, or else loan-maturity terms were shortened and interest 
rates raised. In an initial stage domestic credit was still available, but the rates of interest 
banks were charging for it meant that no firms could possibly take up such loans as a 
rational business proposition. At the same time, the availability of new lines of credit was 
suspended, and later on, once the level of their deposits began to recover again, the banks 
did not want to take risks, and preferred to adopt a ‘wait and see' approach.
In these circumstances what happened was that a large number of contracts 




officially declared bankruptcies rose, and as (even more significantly) firms announced 
informal bankruptcy meetings to arrange refinancing. The combined effect of all these 
developments was that (1) creditors lost part of their assets, and (2 ) no cases are known in 
which additional interest charges were levied in respect of payment arrears. In consequence 
whilst levels of debt have increased, the volume of loans has declined: hence a severe 
mismatch obtains in the overall financial circuit.
Turning, secondly, to the downturn in the *wealth effect’: there is no doubt that a 
strong wealth effect, i.e. a strong rise in expected future incomes, was one of the features 
which typically greatly influenced firms during the Convertibility period. But the situation 
after the 1995' crisis has greatly weakened that effect. The simultaneous combination of a 
reduced level of output, a mismatched financial system and business fragility has led to 
current valuations of firms being greatly downgraded. This affects firms’ credit ratings for 
securing financing, because whilst their debt levels are higher than before, their own value 
as collateral is lower. In fact, their financial exposure has grown and they are rated as credit 
risks. That has become even clearer with the return of normal financing conditions: the 
problem is no longer one of a sufficient supply of finance being available, but of locating 
reliable banking customers.
Turning, thirdly, to changes in the level of output, it is very clear that the expansion 
cycle broke down: thus in 1995 industrial output fell by nearly 7 per cent.8 The domestic 
market had received the direct impact of the difficult financial conditions (including the 
restrictions on loans and the periods of credit interruption) and was also directly affected by 
the worsening conditions in the labor market (where the unemployment rate rose from 6  per 
cent in October 1991 to 16.4 per cent in October 1995). Moreover the impact of the 
recession fell particularly hard on those sectors which had been the dynamic performers 
under Convertibility up until that point. By contrast to the depressed conditions in the
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domestic market, the demand for exports was rising, and it was intermediate goods 
producers who were the main beneficiaries of that development.
A variety of factors have contributed to this significant increase in industrial exports 
(Cepeda, 1995; Bisang and Kosacoff, 1995). Some of the principal factors include changes 
in the Brazilian situation, the major improvement in international prices (especially of 
commodities), the recession in the domestic market, and gains in competitiveness by some 
industrial sectors. However, whilst taking a positive view of this rise in exports, it is also 
sensible to treat it with some caution: this is because these exports come from only a small 
number of firms and sectors; also they have only rather precarious production linkages into 
high value added ‘chains’ of business activity; furthermore the Brazilian market is certainly 
not immune to cyclical difficulties; also, in many cases, export price levels are only 
attractive to firms as a means to assure themselves of a reasonable scale of output and 
cover their variable costs.
In contrast with the past, reductions in the output level now affect firms in a distinct 
way. Minor falls in sales can altera firms' break-even point and, under Argentine conditions, 
that may lead on to very negative and complex repercussions in terms of having a negative 
impact on ‘chains’ of payments.
Nonetheless, a new and positive development is that today there is a much more 
sophisticated level of diagnosis and planning by firms than used to be the case in the import 
substitution stage. A large number of firms have been involved in business negotiation 
processes on the advice of consultants and research teams. In addition, local firms have 
had their horizons widened both through by their involvement in commercial credit and 
banking credit operations, and through their interactions with foreign suppliers whilst 
developing commercial, technological, and representative-agency links with them.
Under these conditions, quite a number of transfers have taken place, at rather low 
prices, of majority stock holdings in businesses which are experiencing financial difficulties
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although they are well-positioned in the local market in the long term. The buyers are in a 
completely different position: they can obtain financing at much lower rates, have the 
technological strength to embark on restructuring processes, and have long-term strategic 
goals. Brazilian and Chilean transnational corporations - amongst others - have 
demonstrated their interest in such transactions, and some actual deals have gone ahead, 
with the food sector being specially targeted. This phenomenon is obviously a selective and 
not a generalized one.
4. Changes in the behavior and structure of Argentine industrial firms in the 1990s
The structure and behavior of industrial firms in the mid-1990s present some new 
features when compared with previous decades. These firms have been faced with 
profound changes in the domestic and international environment - and their responses to 
the new conditions and challenges have been diverse. As was stated earlier, two 
approaches or behaviour patterns can, broadly speaking, be identified: the first is the 
‘offensive’ restructuring strategy: it has led to some notable successes in attaining 
productivity levels close to international standards. The second is the ‘defensive’ strategy: 
its characteristics make it unmistakably clear that efforts to close the productivity gap have 
fallen far short of the mark; and it can also be deduced that firms still suffer today from 
many of the constraints, problems and deficiencies which affected them in the past. Some 
of the most salient stylized facts about this ‘new microeconomy’ will now be described:
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4.1, Capital- and labour-intensity
17
At the start of the 1970s local industry operated with production functions that were, 
mostly, of the more labour-intensive sort. The restructuring, installation and start-up in the 
1980s of some 2 0  manufacturing plants to make widely used intermediate products (steel, 
petrochemicals, refinery products, paper, aluminium etc.) led to a significant shift in 
industrial specialization. The technology in use in these plants is close to international best 
practice - it involves large-scale, continuous processes that are highly capital-intensive. 
Meanwhile, the developmental impact that these plants have had in stimulating progress 
towards the manufacturing of more differentiated products has proved considerably weaker 
than was expected. A further pertinent fact is that the new vegetable-oil plants have also 
employed only very few staff.
In addition, when the main industrial investments made during 1978-95 are 
reviewed, it is clear that: 1) the trend has been towards operating with production functions 
of greater capital intensity, 2 ) a striking proportion of these investments have been carried 
out by a restricted group of national holding companies; and 3) promotional schemes and 
subsidies have played a major role in financing these investments. Everything points to the 
conclusion - if trends observed in the large firms can be extrapolated - that industry must 
have lost its primacy as a source of employment creation - which is exactly what the 
evidence presented earlier showed.
The above points indicate that the trend since the beginning of the 1980s has been 
for the leading Argentine industrial firms to increase the capital intensity of their production 
functions. Furthermore, during the Convertibility period, industrial firms needed to react to 
the fact that industrial gross real profit margins were squeezed down in a context in which 
unit wage costs were rising and price rises were firmly held back by the greater import- 
openness of the economy. This situation led firms, in a first stage, into making labour-force
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reductions and it then led them, in a second stage, into installing new machines, 
technologies and processes that were labour-saving. Economic policy in fact ‘lubricated’ this 
process through the tariff reductions applying to capital goods and through the way in which 
exchange-rate appreciation raised the value of the local currency.
Evidence revealing the decline in the capacity of this ‘new microeconomy’ to create 
new jobs shows up clearly in the periods of output growth that have taken place during 
Convertibility (1991-94). The evidence of decline in employment-generating capacity is 
even more pronounced - indeed alarmingly so - when one looks at the period during which 
output has contracted (1995). This latter period has been associated with a major increase 
in the open-unemployment rate, (which reached 18 per cent in 1996/97, roughly three times 
its historical average rate). Moreover it is quite clear that industrial activities have been one 
of the casual factors producing this state of affairs.
4.2. Changes in the behavior and technological trajectory of industrial firms
The conditions which established the overall framework for the economy in the 
1990s have tended to invoke a new pattern of technological behavior from industry. This 
differs, greatly from the pattern that was typically followed by firms in the import substitution 
period (for which, see Katz, 1986). Some of the central features of the new pattern are:
i) For a group of firms - and this especially applies to those in the metal products and 
machinery industry - there has been a growing trend towards them participating in 
international trading networks. This approach enables the firms concerned to begin to 
specialize more than before, and to start reducing their product mix whilst also ‘de- 
integrating’ some of their production facilities whilst making far greater use of the trading 
network. The technological implication that inherently follows from the increasing levels of 
globalization in production is that firms have to specialize in making products that meet
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international technical standards. This leads them into activities that tend to reduce the 
extent of the technological gap that exists in product technologies. But at the same time it 
discourages local firms from making their own R&D efforts either to develop some new 
product or process or to adapt foreign technologies. (At any rate it tends at least to minimize 
such R&D or adaptative efforts). Also, it does nothing to strengthen the domestic chain of 
suppliers.
ii) In contrast, a circumscribed group of firms are strengthening their systems for 
adopting technology (via the channel of importing capital goods). This forms part of their 
strategy to incorporate foreign products and processes so as to have a widened product mix 
to offer when operating in segmented-demand areas the consumer mass market. These are 
firms that actively supply the internal market and whose influence also extends outwards to 
the rest of the MERCOSUR countries. The activities of the firms concerned are based both 
on natural advantages and on the fact that they have for many years engaged in a process 
of building up (and acquiring) capabilities (in food products, drinks, dairy products etc.). 
iii) There has been a decline in the output from the local ‘technology-intensive’ sectors, i.e. 
from those very branches of industry that are regarded as ‘engine-of-growth’ sectors in the 
more successful economies. In fact, the contraction in local production of pharmaceutical 
products, some capital goods, a range of electronics industry goods, and 
telecommunications products deprives the local economy both of a degree of independence 
and of the ‘spillover’ effects that would accrue to the rest of the economy if these sectors 
were performing well.
iv) A greater level of concern is evident about organizational technologies. This has 
happened for various reasons which include: (a) the fact that production methods are being 
re-examined to include new criteria linked to flexibilization and specialization 
(subcontracting, quality management, just-in-time, etc.), (b) the fact that more frequent use 
is being made of forms of business organization and cooperation that were very unusual in
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the 1970s (national holding companies, partnerships between local and foreign firms, 
complementarily agreements, etc.), and (c) the impact which the takeover of firms by the 
next generation has been having. The extensive activity by large national and international 
consulting firms in Argentina in the last few years does suggest that these organizational 
technologies must at least have begun to diffuse into industry.9 Another sign of the adoption 
of such changes is that some firms have subjected themselves to having their technological 
level and capability tested through the international certification process (Ramos, 1995).
v) In terms of international comparisons the typical local 1970s plant was one that - 
amongst its other characteristics - operated on a small production scale and with a 
significant productivity gap. In the 1990s these characteristics have been modified to some 
extent, but continue basically to hold true. In that regard, some current surveys have shown 
that the majority of local industrial plants differ in size from their competitors' - plants both in 
Brazil and in the rest of the world. In one study of comparative production scales it was 
shown that out of 408 cases, 78 per cent involved cases where local (i.e. Argentine) plants 
were smaller in scale. In those cases where local plants were either larger or equal in scale, 
35 per cent of them were from the food sector, and 30 per cent (the next largest group) were 
from the chemical-pharmaceutical sector (Secretaría de Programación Económica, 1994).
Under the conditions prevailing in the economy in the 1990s, the targeted 
investments that were made, the adoption of soft technologies, the adjustments made to 
staffing levels, and the increases in output levels have all led to significant increases in 
industry’s productivity. Moreover it is clear from analyzing particular cases (such as the 
motor vehicles, steel, light metals, and paper industries) as well as from considering 
manufacturing industry as a whole, that strong increases in industrial productivity occurred 
between the last few years of the 1980s and the mid-1990s (Fanelli, Kacef and Machinea, 
1994). Nevertheless, with the exception of some plants representing large-scale 
investments made in the previous decade, average productivity levels still differ greatly
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from the levels achieved by firms and/or sectors internationally. To a large extent local 
productivity growth has come up against a limiting factor in the form of the initial stock of 
equipment and machinery which the plants started out with and the way in which the plants 
are organized - both of which in essence, data from various decades back.
By way of summary, in a setting where a heterogeneous range of behaviours are in 
evidence, the tendency has been for firms to follow a pattern of technological behavior that 
is very closely allied to what is being supplied to them from abroad. This has been 
accompanied by stronger negotiating capacity and better initial knowledge on their part, and 
by the disbandment of teams involved in technological developments involving major 
‘localist’ components. Also, much stronger emphasis than before is now placed on 
organizational aspects as applied not just to production but to sales and finances as well.
4.3 The boundaries of Argentine manufacturing firms
One of the typical features of local industrial development at the beginning of the 
1970s was the high degree of vertical integration in firms. The firms then operated almost 
entirely in the small, protected domestic market, in which there was only a quite weak 
presence of specialist supplier firms. At the same time, firms' organizations were strongly 
centralized - since most of them were family businesses.
Significant changes are, however, now visible in the industrial organization of a 
great many production plants in terms of how they tackle the ‘make versus subcontract’ 
decision (i.e. whether to make parts or buy them in, whether to handle in-house or to 
subcontract specific process stages for particular products, and whether to obtain their 
supplies from the domestic market or from imports. The general trend indicates that firms 
have been moving towards the ‘de-integration’ of their production activities. The changes 
made in this direction have arisen in response to: (a) changes in relative prices; (b)
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modifications made in the legal regulatory framework for importing parts and components 
(as expressed, particularly, in the reformulated sectoral policies applying to motor vehicles, 
tractors, the naval industry, and electric motors, amongst others); (c) changes introduced in 
general economic conditions so as to achieve greater stability and economic openness, 
which have lowered uncertainty and raised confidence in the credibility of contractual 
relationships and the functioning of market mechanisms.
This process has not, however, been accompanied and balanced out by a 
strengthening in the networks of local sub-contractors. Indeed, the new regulatory conditions 
(like those applying to motor vehicles, and those that govern specialization), and the fact 
that some firms are linked to organizations abroad (through ownership or specific 
agreements), as well as the favorable terms offered by external suppliers, have all had the 
effect that when firms have vertically de-integrated their plants they have then tended to 
obtain most of their resulting requirements for substitutes by way of imports (Kosacoff, 
1997). This is one of the factors which explains why the ratio of value added to the value of 
production has fallen in the past decade.
In short, the data show that the manufacturing sector has itself utilized trade 
openness and economic deregulation to increase its imports not only of parts and 
components but of finished products, too. This is indicative of a trend towards the vertical 
de-integration of activities that affects both manufacturing activities (as revealed by the 
levels of parts and components purchases from abroad) and commercialization activities (as 
revealed by the way that product lines for sales purposes are rounded out with imported 
products). To judge from the data, vertical de-integration of production is a process carried 
out in association with foreign suppliers, and this is consistent with how the subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations behave, especially within the MERCOSUR area. In that regard a 
study of a representative group of main subsidiaries of transnational corporations in
Argentina reveals that 60 per cent of their exports and 78 per cent of their imports are intra-
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corporate transactions - i.e. consist of trade between those corporations' own divisions and 
units. Of the imports, 56.6 per cent correspond to inputs and 40.4 per cent to final goods 
(Kosacoff and Bezchinsky, 1994).
A complementary development that has occurred - and especially so in larger-sized 
firms - is that companies have increased the volume of their activities which they contract 
externally for rather than carry them out inside their plants like they did before. No 
aggregate, quantitative estimates exist for this development but it can easily be verified that 
there has been widespread adoption throughout industry of higher levels of contracting out 
of services such as maintenance, security, cleaning, catering, training, advertising, 
marketing etc. Until quite recently these activities were being handled in house. So when 
this changed, it had a negative impact on employment in industry itself and on the value 
added directly by industry, whilst generating an increased level of demands from industry 
upon the service sector.
4.4 The profile of firms in industry
Both the composition of the industrial sector and the way it is developing in the mid- 
1990 show that the profile of industry is now different from what it was like in the previous 
few decades. The first point is that, owing to privatization, scarcely any State firms are left in 
the industrial sector. Turning, next, to the changes that have taken place in transnational 
corporations (TCs), in national holding firms, and in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) - these have certainly not been minor ones either: Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this book 




5. A  brief assessment of recent industrial development
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It would be hard to find anyone seriously disagreeing with the assessment that the 
second half of the 1970s marked a turning point in Argentine industrial development. This is 
not merely because manufacturing activities in the ISI period differed from how they are 
today. In addition, the viewpoints that were held and the kinds of forecasts that were made 
at that time about industry's future bear little resemblance to the way in which industry has 
actually developed since then. What happened was that in 1978, a start was made on the 
process of dismantling the industrialization model that had been articulated so centrally 
around import substitution.
However, this whole process did not by any means take place in a smooth sequence 
of phases, and nor was it a progression of events that succeeded each other in a linear, 
inevitable way. On the contrary, one of the hallmarks of the process, at least until the end of 
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, was that both forward and backward steps were 
involved in it. Thus, the period 1976-82 was one when political interests favorable to a more 
open economy were vigorously attaining in positions of power. But this same period also 
saw other important interests mobilizing to defend and continue with the import substitution 
model - and on occasions they received some support and reinforcement from the state 
itself. External conditions also played a circumstantial role at that time by ‘casting their lot’ 
(as it were) in support of the import substitution interests. This was very clearly the case with 
the foreign-debt crisis that occurred at the start of the 1980s: for, in addition to its other 
consequences, the debt crisis imposed a virtually unavoidable new ‘shutting-in’ process on 
the indebted economies (i.e. it forced a kind of semi-closure of these economies once 
more).
Toward the end of the 1980s, the combination of (a) the dramatic circumstances
that then surrounded domestic political, social and economic events, and (b) the rapid
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globalization process then occurring due to new international economic conditions, created a 
set of conditions that became more and more strongly favorable to those forces and
interests who wanted to introduce a greater degree of commercial, financial and
technological opening-up of the economy. Indeed the impact of these conditions was so 
strong as to make it effectively inevitable that a transition to a different kind of dynamic 
industrial structure would occur. Some opposing tendencies continued to exist, but they 
rapidly diminished in importance.
In the new conditions that became dominant, it was very clear that the economic 
'game’ was now being played under new rules and that the competitive environment for firms 
had changed. It then soon became obvious that there were very marked contrasts in the 
kinds of responses and reactions - and results - which businesses were having as they faced
these new conditions. Indeed the heterogeneity in firms' responses was one of the key
characteristics observable in the new economic conditions.
In this new (and very different) framework, when the time comes to assess how well 
firms have been performing and what their future prospects (including for survival) are, then 
one parameter that unavoidably has to be considered is the lesser or greater degree to 
which firms have succeeded in their efforts to close or reduce the productivity gap that 
separates them from the levels of productivity prevailing in the more developed economies. 
Meanwhile, the phenomenon of simultaneous but widely contrasting responses by firms has 
also (a) become translated, over time, into a growing degree of heterogeneity in the 
industrial structure, and (b) become discernible in terms of the impact which it has had on 
the recorded statistics for value added in production - which, from a medium-term 
perspective, do not indicate that much progress has been achieved by industry as a whole. 
On the contrary, in the case of gross industrial output, the provisional data which have been 
circulated from the 1994 Census reveal that in the period 1986-93 the ratio of value added 
to the value of goods produced went down significantly.
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However, notwithstanding the possible differences of view that may exist as to what 
the correct figures are (although not about what signs they have) a broad consensus exists 
among industry researchers that, during the 1990s so far, manufacturing activity has been, 
in net terms, a shedder of employment. It is also widely accepted that the numbers of both 
manufacturing establishments and production lines have diminished; that the extent of 
external trade openness has increased, although more on the import side than on the export 
side; that significant investment inflows have occurred at least when compared to their level 
in previous years; and that these investments have gone mainly into larger-sized firms by 
means of acquisition of existing firms; that the majority of output (and also a growing 
percentage of it) is produced in large and medium-large firms; and that these large and 
medium-large firms are a segment of the business world in which the level of foreign 
ownership has significantly increased.
It is also a matter of consensus that, in spite of signs of some ‘half-hearted’ progress 
being made towards reducing the level of concentration of banking credit, large firms still 
continue to corner a huge proportion of all loans, whilst at the same time SMEs continue to 
grapple with almost the same tough obstacles to obtaining loans as they faced in the not so 
distant past - both in their dealings with the local banking system and as regards their 
access to the domestic and international capital market. It is also widely accepted that 
output prices have gone down appreciably both in relation to the costs of the inputs and 
services required in production and in relation to the wages of workers and employees; and 
that the value-added coefficient has declined abruptly in the context of a parallel decline in 
the real gross profit margin of manufacturing activities.
There is also general agreement on the fact that significant microeconomic changes 
have occurred in recent years. Some of the salient changes of this kind include all the 
following ones: (a) firms are making more widespread use of less labour-intensive 
production functions; (b) there has been a growing trend towards adopting product
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technologies from abroad that are close to international best-practice ones, and this has had 
a negative effect on local adaptative efforts; (c) the cancellation of those local technological 
efforts that involve domestic generation of new products or processes have been even more 
systematic and frequent than before; (d) levels of vertical integration of domestic production 
have become much lower due mainly to the replacement of domestic value-added by 
greater levels of imported content and due secondarily to the only meager progress 
achieved by the weak local subcontracting industry); (e) as a major step in reorienting their 
efforts, firms have significantly streamlined their product mixes and these same firms have 
also then filled out their product ranges with imports so as to ensure they can supply a wide 
range of products to the domestic market; (f) a growing trend has taken place towards the 
‘outsourcing’ of activities (especially auxiliary services) which until recently, were being 
carried out with their own staff; (g) companies have become more ‘internationalized’ and 
firms' growth strategies have increasingly placed their emphasis on export markets, 
especially on MERCOSUR; (h) there has been a shake-up in the ranking by output of 
different segments of the business community: in particular, both transnational corporation 
subsidiaries and large national holding companies have steadily been gaining larger shares 
of output while state firms have virtually disappeared; (i) ‘soft’ innovations have been 
introduced which (along with all the other changes) have resulted in gains in labour-and 
equipment-productivity - in fact it is the existence of differential productivity growth between 
firms which has been the real motor of the growing structural heterogeneity that has been 
taking shape, both inter-and intra-sectorally, throughout the whole of industry.
Notwithstanding the above range of microeconomic changes, the evidence shows 
that the relative importance of manufacturing activities as a ‘driver’ of overall GDP has 
progressively been declining, and that manufacturing is heavily dependent on external 
financial cycles, and, moreover, that the pattern of leadership within the manufacturing 
sector has been a changing one. These points of evidence all combine in tending to show
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that the previously-mentioned changes of a microeconomic nature have not been sufficient 
to give shape to a new industrialization model or lay the foundations for growth that would 
be more sustainable in the long term. Nevertheless, when the effort is made to examine the 
results of all the above mentioned changes in terms of the progress made in the levels of 
output, and of value-added, one finds that some surprisingly divergent interpretations of the 
facts have been put forward.
Thus, according to people who analyze the figures produced by the system of 
National Accounts, the above-mentioned process of changes is supposed to have led to 31 
per cent growth in output and in GDP between 1990 and 1994 (or 20 per cent growth up to 
1994 if the base year is taken as 1986). These growth figures are then regarded as 
supporting the interpretation that the economic benefits secured in terms of output and 
productivity do actually ‘legitimize’ the policies pursued, since the benefits obtained are 
regarded as outweighing the inevitable costs and sacrifices which structural adjustment and 
reform programmes bring in their train. In contrast to this view, the approach taken by those 
who expressed ‘critical’ interpretations was rather different. As they could neither ignore nor 
not avoid or deny the evidence of output and productivity gains, they wavered between (a) 
expressing their manifest disapproval of the character and direction of the changes that 
were taking place, and (b) presenting lists of recommendations which either were about how 
to correct or improve some aspects of the policies in force, or else were about why entirely 
new kinds of measures were needed of the sort which (at least up until then) the authorities 
were not adopting.
Publication of the 1994 Census data introduced a more balanced perspective into 
assessments of the results of the structural adjustment and reform process. This sense of 
perspective (i.e. caution) had been lacking until then - because no quantitative evidence, 
even of a provisional kind, had existed to back it up. However what this Census data has 
now indicated is that the growth in output between 1990 and 1994 was only half as great as
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had previously been supposed, and that the corresponding figure for growth in value added 
was negligible. The results look even worse when the comparison is made with the 1986 
figures: in that case, output is up by only 8 per cent and value added is down by around 10 
per cent.
However, only a quite short time has elapsed since the structural adjustment and 
reform process got under way. So it is too soon to be able to evaluate its results in a 
categorical way. What is, however, already clear, is that it would now be extremely difficult 
to put this reform process into reverse in its substantive aspects. The kind of 
industrialization that was articulated around the linchpin of import substitution had, by 
around the mid-1970s, yielded up just about everything it was capable of. Already in those 
years it was hard to deny the need for reforms which, whilst making good use of the positive 
aspects of the existing economic model, would involve changes towards uniting with (and 
melding with) a more open and competitive kind of model. Such a model would, it was 
envisaged, stimulate the creation of an industrial fabric based on more modern 
organizational principles, more recent technology and up-to-date products, in which 
manufacturing activities would incorporate a larger percentage of domestic value added.
Although it clearly is too soon for any conclusive assessment to be made of the 
structural reform process, the substance of what the new census data is pointing out is 
firstly, that the costs associated with the structural adjustment and reform process have 
been higher than was initially estimated, and secondly that the results achieved, (in terms of 
growth in output and value added) have been significantly less than was initially announced. 
But what the Census data do not say is that the higher-than-estimated costs and lower-than- 
expected growth might, possibly, owe something to a certain kind of ‘non-involvement’ in 
the stance adopted by the public authorities - this applies, especially, to the government's 
over-inclination for leaving the direction and speed of the industrial transformation process 
to be determined entirely by the free play of market forces. The implication is that the costs
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associated with the structural adjustment reforms have been left free to increase more than 
they need have done - especially when account is taken of the low levels of domestic value 
added that are incorporated in products, the low levels to which employment has fallen, the 
extent to which production lines have been decommissioned and firms closed down, and the 
degree to which concentration and transnationalization in industry have proceeded, etc. If 
this attitude of ‘non-involvement’ were to change, it could signify that the process of 





1 See Kosacoff (1994).
2 For the particular cases of the iron and steel industry and the petrochemical complex see Bisang 
(1989), and Lopez (1993) respectively.
3 For the particular case of agribusiness, see Obschatko (1993).
4 See Kosacoff, Todesca and Vispo (1991).
5 For a more detailed analysis of Convertibility see Canavese (1992), Bouzas (1993), and Porta 
(1995).
6 A study by Fundación Capital of 76 firms quoted on the Buenos Aires stock exchange - which 
represented approximately 90 per cent of total capital stock quoted there - came to the following 
conclusions: (a) the degree of indebtedness (liabilities/net worth) had doubled; (b) negotiable 
obligations had become a significant additional financial instrument; (c) indebtedness in U.S. dollars 
had deepened and no market existed for long-run loans in pesos; (d) access to international financial 
markets had recently become complicated; (e) the percentages of payment arrears had increased. See 
Am bito Financiero (1994).
7 According to Report No. 3 of the provisional results of the 1994 National Economic Census, 
released by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), the ratio of gross value added 
to gross value of production for the industrial sector went down from 43.3 per cent in 1986 to 36.3 
per cent in 1994.
8 A growth path which lasted 19 quarters (and which had led output to increase by more than 30 per 
cent from 1990 to 1994) came to end in the second quarter of 1995 when output fell by 4.1 per cent. 
The decline for the whole of 1995 was 7 per cent. The contraction buffeted the various sectors 
differently. Hardest hit were producers of durable consumer goods (and especially the motor vehicles 
industry) who had led the way in industry's recovery since the start of the Convertibility Plan. The
intermediate-goods-producing sectors are the ones which have recently been expanding their output, 
in marked contrast to how their output declined in the first years of Convertibility.
9 The interest in this subject is also apparent from the viewpoint of the requirements for staff training 
that arise due to the new ways in which production is organized (Fuchs, 1994).
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